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Bank lending has been notably more subdued in the first half of 2021, mainly as a 
result of the fall in demand. This moderation contrasts with the growth observed 
during the initial phases of the pandemic, which was driven by the private sector’s 
liquidity needs and the support schemes established to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis. The volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) has continued to decline, although 
significant latent risks have been detected. Specifically, these are more 
pronounced in the loans granted under the support schemes which were naturally 
concentrated in the hardest-hit sectors and businesses. The economic upturn has 
led to the recovery in bank profitability which, nevertheless, remains relatively low 
compared with that of other sectors and non-euro area banking systems. The 
measures implemented by the authorities have also been key to increasing banks’ 
solvency in the past year. In this connection, the stress tests conducted by the Banco 
de España and the European Banking Authority (EBA) reflect the banking sector’s 
considerable resilience, in aggregate terms, to the materialisation of the risks 
identified, although there are notable differences across banks in terms of capital 
charges under the adverse scenario. In any case, the results of these tests do not 
indicate a need for extensive supervisory intervention under this scenario. The high 
risk-absorbing capacity of banks can be partly explained by the measures adopted 
by the authorities to address the economic and social effects of the crisis.   
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 Balance sheet structure, risks and vulnerabilities
Credit risk
The	volume	of	lending	to	the	resident	private	sector	in	Spain	remained	stable	
in the last 12 months as a whole. Lending by deposit institutions to the resident 
private sector fell by 0.2%1 from June 2020 (see Chart 2.1.1), in clear contrast to the 
increase posted between December 2019 and June 2020, which was largely due to 
the economic policy measures implemented to alleviate the effects of the pandemic. 
The slight decline in the stock was influenced by the sharp decrease in total new 
lending granted to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) in 2021 H1, 
which fell by 31% year-on-year. This reduction is mainly explained by the lower 
1	 	The	change	in	June	2021	was	affected	by	a	corporate	transaction	consisting	of	the	absorption	of	an	SLI	into	a	
significant	deposit	institution	(DI).	Excluding	this	operation,	the	year-on-year	decrease	in	credit	would	be	0.8%.
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volume of new loans with ICO guarantees which amounted to less than €10 billion, 
far below the amount of almost €70 billion recorded in 2020 H1.  The increase in 
principal drawn down also moderated, thus converging to pre-pandemic levels.
Slower	growth	in	lending	to	NFCs	and	sole	proprietors,	mainly	those	hardest	
hit	 by	 the	 pandemic,	 contrasted	 with	 the	 quickening	 growth	 of	 lending	 to	
households. The volume of lending to NFCs and sole proprietors decreased by 
1.6% (see Chart 2.2.1) in the last 12 months, reflecting the significant contraction, of 
40%, in new lending to these enterprises in 2021 H1 overall, compared with the 
same period a year earlier. In fact, lending to NFCs and sole proprietors in the sectors 
most severely affected by the pandemic posted the strongest growth in 2020 H1.2 
So far in 2021, growth rates have levelled across different sectors, all of which show 
a clear trend towards stabilisation (see Chart 2.2.2). Lending to households rose by 
1.2% year-on-year, following growth of 20.1% in new lending in H1, compared with 
2	 	Lending	to	the	hardest-hit	sectors	is	proxied	by	that	corresponding	to	the	sectors	with	a	fall	in	turnover	of	more	
than	15%	in	2020,	which	can	be	identified	in	the	FI-130	regulatory	return.	Specifically,	lending	to	the	most	severely	
affected	 sectors	 includes	 hospitality,	 the	 manufacture	 of	 refined	 petroleum	 products,	 social	 services	 and	
entertainment,	transportation	and	storage,	and	the	manufacture	of	transport	equipment.
The stock of credit, which grew at the start of the pandemic as a result of the economic policy measures adopted (mainly ICO guarantees), 
remained stable over the last 12 months (-0.2% year-on-year in June 2021). In 2021 H1, new lending to non-financial corporations and sole 
proprietors decreased notably with respect to the previous year owing to the lower volume of new ICO-backed loans to businesses. However, 
new lending to households rose significantly.
THE VOLUME OF LENDING TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR REMAINED STABLE OVER THE LAST 12 MONTHS, LARGELY
DUE TO THE MODERATION IN NEW LOANS WITH ICO GUARANTEES
Chart 2.1
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the same period a year earlier. Specifically, new lending for house purchase, which 
notably exceeded that recorded in the same period in 2019. 
The	volume	of	NPLs	has	continued	to	decline	in	2021,	albeit	at	a	slower	pace	
than	in	pre-pandemic	years. In June 2021, non-performing assets fell by 5.8% 
year-on-year, compared with the double-digit declines posted in the years before 
the pandemic. Since December 2013, NPLs have decreased by €137 billion, 
representing a cumulative decline of 73%.3 The fact that they have not increased 
since the onset of the pandemic marks a departure from past economic crises in 
Spain, when NPLs rose strongly during the first year of economic contraction. 
3	 	The	application	since	1	January	2021	of	EBA	guidelines	(EBA/GL/2016/07)	with	respect	to	the	new	definition	
of	 default	 pursuant	 to	Article	 178	of	 (EU)	Regulation	575/2013	has	given	 rise	 to	 some	differences	 in	 the	
amounts	classified	as	“non-performing	for	accounting	purposes”	(accounting	definition	contained	in	Banco	
de	España	Circular	4/2017)	and	“non-performing	for	prudential	purposes”	(according	to	previous	guidelines).	
Specifically,	 in	 the	 first	 six	months	 of	 2021,	 the	 so-called	 “NPLs	 for	 prudential	 purposes”	 accounted	 for	
around	10%	more	than	“NPLs	for	accounting	purposes”,	which	in	absolute	terms	amounts	to	approximately	
€5.5 billion.
The volume of lending to non-financial corporations and sole proprietors declined slightly in the last year, contrasting with the strong growth 
posted at the start of the pandemic, mainly in the most severely affected sectors. The subdued growth rates in lending to the most severely 
affected sectors has resulted in convergence towards that of those less affected. The stock of loans to households grew moderately in H1, 
while the flow of new lending was notably higher than in the same period a year earlier.
LENDING TO THE CORPORATE SECTOR DECLINED IN 2021 H1, WITH DIFFERENT SECTORS SHOWING MORE EVEN
BEHAVIOUR THAN IN 2020. IN CONTRAST, LENDING TO HOUSEHOLDS GREW IN THE SAME PERIOD
Chart 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Lending to the more severely affected sectors is proxied by that corresponding to sectors with a fall in turnover of more than 15% in 2020, which 
can be identified in the FI-130 regulatory return. Specifically, lending to the more severely affected sectors includes hospitality, the manufacture of 
refined petroleum products, social services and entertainment, transportation and storage, and the manufacture of transport equipment. Lending to 
moderately affected sectors is proxied using the following sectorisation in the FI-130 regulatory return: metallurgy, manufacture of machinery, other 
manufacturing activities, professional services, mining and quarrying, wholesale and retail trade, and repair of vehicles. Other productive activities 










Jun-18 Jun-19 Jun-20 Jun-21
1  YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE OF CHANGE IN THE STOCK OF LOANS 
LEFT) AND NEW LOANS (RIGHT)
Business in Spain, ID














 Less affected sectors
2018 H1 2019 H1 2020 H1 2021 H1
%
2  SIX-MONTHLY RATE OF CHANGE IN LENDING.
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS AND SOLE PROPRIETORS





















BANCO DE ESPAÑA 54 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
The NPL ratio also continued to decline in the last 12 months, again more 
moderately	than	before	the	outbreak	of	the	COVID-19	crisis. In June 2021, the 
NPL ratio for lending to the resident private sector stood at 4.3% (see Chart 2.3.1), 
down 0.25 pp from the same month a year earlier. The lower decline in NPLs 
(numerator) and the stalling growth in lending (denominator) explain the moderate 
fall in the ratio in the last 12 months.  As mentioned in previous FSRs, economic 
policy measures such as furlough schemes, tax moratoria and public guarantee and 
debt moratoria schemes have sustained the financial capacity of economic agents, 
particularly firms, thus cushioning the impact of the economic downturn observed in 
Spain as a result of the pandemic. In this connection, the rate of decline of NPLs of 
non-financial corporations and sole proprietors slowed, whereas in the case of 
households, the NPL ratio continued to fall.
Despite	the	aggregate	decline	in	NPLs,	there	are	some	signs	of	credit	quality	
impairment,	in	particular	the	increase	in	refinanced	and	Stage	2	loans.	Stage 
2 loans, with a higher anticipated probability of default than other performing 
loans,4 increased substantially (53%) in the last 12 months (see Chart 2.3.2). This 
trend began to be observed in 2020 Q3, quickening notably in 2020 Q4, with the 
year-on-year rate of change in these loans continuing to rise. Forborne loans, 
which had declined more moderately in recent quarters, posted an increase of 
8.8% year-on-year in June 2021, possibly indicating some banks’ greater recourse 
to them to mitigate the loan repayment difficulties encountered by some borrowers, 
especially NFCs.5
The	 sectors	 hardest	 hit	 by	 the	pandemic	 are	 those	with	 the	most	 evident	
signs	of	current	and	potential	credit	impairment. NFCs and sole proprietors in 
these economic sectors, which were particularly affected, first and foremost 
because of the restrictions on activity, have seen their ability to repay existing 
loans diminish. This initially led to higher Stage 2 loans to these sectors, especially 




increased. The proportion of loans linked to expired or cancelled moratoria which 
showed signs of credit impairment (see Chart 2.4.1) was 20% for Stage 2 (compared 
with 19% in December 2020), and 9% for NPLs (compared with 8% in December 
2020). This impairment could increase in the coming quarters, since a significant 





BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
The volume of NPLs continued on the downward trend of recent years, although the decline was more moderate. This, along with the 
stabilisation of lending between June 2020 and June 2021, led to a lower decline also in the NPL ratio. However, early signs of loan 
repayment difficulties by economic agents were observed, such as the strong increase in Stage 2 loans, particularly in the sectors most 
severely affected by the pandemic, and a year-on-year increase in refinanced loans, something which had not occurred since the end of the 
global financial crisis.
THE VOLUME OF NPLs CONTINUED TO DECLINE, ALTHOUGH SOME SIGNS OF CREDIT QUALITY IMPAIRMENT AND UNEVEN
BEHAVIOUR ACROSS SECTORS WERE OBSERVED
Chart 2.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Lending to the more severely affected sectors is proxied by that corresponding to sectors with a fall in turnover of more than 15% in 2020, which 
can be identified in the FI-130 regulatory return. Specifically, lending to the more severely affected sectors includes hospitality, the manufacture of 
refined petroleum products, social services and entertainment, transportation and storage, and the manufacture of transport equipment. Lending to 
moderately affected sectors is proxied using the following sectorisation in the FI-130 regulatory return: metallurgy, manufacture of machinery, other 
manufacturing activities, professional services, mining and quarrying, wholesale and retail trade, and repair of vehicles. Other productive activities 
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2021. However, the loans benefitting from moratoria account for a small percentage 
of banks’ portfolios.6 The situation of ICO-guaranteed loans granted to non-financial 
corporations and sole proprietors had deteriorated in June 2021 with respect to 
December 2020 (see Chart 2.4.2). In transactions with ICO guarantees, Stage 2 
loans accounted for 16% of the credit drawn, an increase of 8 percentage points 
(pp). The increase was more subdued in the case of sole proprietors, but it reached 
the same percentage. It should be borne in mind that a large portion of these ICO-
guaranteed loans currently have payment holidays, which reduces the possibility of 
credit risks materialising in the short term.  It is also observed that the proportion of 
ICO loans linked to customers with one or more troubled loans (of all their loans, not 
only those with ICO guarantees) has increased significantly in the case of NFCs. The 
abundant signs of credit impairment in customers with ICO guarantees suggests 
that risk in ICO-backed loans may materialise to a greater extent, once the payment 
holidays have expired. Box 2.1 analyses in more detail the characteristics of the 
6	 	Loans	that	have	become	subject	to	moratoria	at	any	point	since	the	onset	of	the	crisis	amount	to	€60.5	billion	
(8.6%	of	all	lending	in	the	loan	portfolios	eligible	for	moratoria	and	5.5%	of	all	lending	to	the	non-financial	private	
sector in December 2020.
The credit quality of loans linked to expired moratoria worsened in 2021 H1 owing to the behaviour of those with no mortgage guarantee. The 
credit quality of ICO backed loans deteriorated, as the ratio of loans in Stage 2 and of non-performing loans increased. This deterioration can 
also be observed when analysing the overall quality of all loans arranged by customers who have been granted ICO-backed loans.
THE SIGNS OF DETERIORATION IN THE CREDIT QUALITY OF LOANS WITH EXPIRED MORATORIA REMAIN AND HAVE
INTENSIFIED IN THE CASE OF ICO-BACKED LOANS
Chart 2.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In the customer-level analysis, for each firm or sole proprietor with one or more ICO-backed loans all possible deteriorations are identified in any of 
their loans (ICO-backed or otherwise) arranged with the bank that granted it the ICO-backed loan or with other banks. If customers have problematic 
loans above a minimum materiality threshold, they are flagged as a customer with some sign of deterioration. In the analysis at customer-guaranteed 
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businesses and banks which have participated in ICO guarantee schemes, and 
the effect of these on the structure of banking relationships. Box 2.2 examines 
recent developments in the duration and expiry of payment holidays for ICO-
backed loans.




December 2019 to June 2021, the volume of euro-denominated assets abroad of 
Spanish deposit institutions fell by 11.8%. Several factors unrelated to the bank 
lending situation in the geographical areas in which these institutions operate 
contributed to this decline. In particular, there was significant divestment in the 
United States by a Spanish deposit institution, with reclassification of the amount to 
non-current assets held for sale until the transaction was completed in 2021 Q2. The 
decline in Turkey was mainly due to the behaviour of its currency vis-à-vis the euro. 
Such behaviour was similar, but less pronounced, in Brazil and Mexico (see Chart 
2.5.1). Although NPL ratios remained stable in 2020 in the main geographical areas 
in which Spanish deposit institutions are present, they increased across the board 
in 2021 H1. The NPL ratio in Turkey stood at 8.8% in June 2021, up 2.4 pp since 
Credit exposure abroad has decreased by 11.8% since the pandemic broke. The decline observed in the United States was the result of the 
divestment in that geographical area by a Spanish bank. The appreciation of the euro against local currencies contributed to the decline in 
the exposure to Turkey, Mexico and Brazil. NPL ratios held stable during the initial quarters of the pandemic, but started to rise in 2021 H1, 
reaching the highest values in Turkey and Brazil.
THE VOLUME OF ASSETS HELD ABROAD BY SPANISH BANKS HAS FALLEN SINCE THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC, PARTLY
AS A RESULT OF THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPRECIATION OF THE EURO AND THE DIVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Chart 2.5
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December 2020, while Brazil posted 5.4% and Mexico 3.8%, with increases of 1.8 




operations (TLTRO III), which have pushed down interest rates on unsecured 
loans. The Eurosystem’s balance sheet has almost doubled since the start of the 
pandemic, driven by the different purchase programmes and loan facilities, which 
have led to a rise in the system’s excess liquidity. Money market interest rates have 
continued to fall in this setting of ample liquidity (see Chart 2.6.1). The significant 
increase in refinancing operations in the summer of 20207 led to a gradual fall in the 
unsecured rate (€STR8) and therefore, to a considerably larger negative gap 
between the latter and the deposit facility rate, which has remained largely unchanged 
in 2021. The repo rate9 has also tended to decline owing to excess liquidity, and the 
reduction of available collateral resulting from, among other factors, the increase in 
purchases by the Eurosystem. However, the relationship between the repo-deposit 
facility rate spread and excess liquidity has been less intense in recent months, 
thanks to the increase in securities lending by the Eurosystem since end-2020, and 
to the relaxation of collateral requirements in financing transactions in which assets 
other than sovereign debt are accepted.10 
The	interbank	funding	spread11	has	remained	relatively	stable,	while	the	market	
perception	 of	 credit	 risk	 at	 Spanish	 banks	 is	 very	 low (see Chart 2.6.2). The 
interbank funding spread has remained at levels similar to those observed at the date 
of the last report, with a slight rebound in the months of September and October, and 
market expectations regarding this indicator suggest that the interbank costs could 
increase slightly in 2022, coinciding with the termination of the PEPP and the end of 
the favourable financing conditions applied to TLTRO III.12 
 7	 	In	the	fourth	and	fifth	rounds	of	TLTRO	III	in	2020,	euro	area	banks	applied	for	€1,308	billion	and	€175	billion,	




provided by the 48 euro area MMSR reporting banks. 
 9	 	Refers	to	the	overnight	rate,	according	to	the	data	reported	by	banks	to	the	MMSR,	agreed	with	other	financial	
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The	cost	of	issuance	for	banks	on	the	wholesale	market	has	decreased	across	
the	board,	whereas	 the	volume	of	 issues	remains	high (see Charts 2.6.3 and 
2.6.4). Investors’ perception of risk regarding debt issued by banks13 is very low, as 
13	 	Measured	using	 the	credit	 risk	premium	 for	unsecured	bank	 lending	 (in	euro),	which	 is	calculated	as	 the	spread	
between	the	interest	rate	on	the	secondary	market	of	each	listed	bond	and	the	German	Bund	with	the	same	maturity.	
Money market interest rates have remained on a downward path in 2021, with a strong negative correlation between money market spreads and the 
deposit facility rate and rising volumes of excess liquidity and growth in purchase programmes. However, the impact of purchase programmes’ on 
lower repo rates through collateral availability seems to have diminished in 2021. Likewise, interbank funding costs are expected to recover slightly in 
2022, when some monetary policy measures are set to end, but would hold at pre-COVID levels; so too would the risk premium for Spanish banks’ 
bond issuances. Consistent with this, the cost (and volume) of bank issuances on the wholesale market remain at historically low (high) levels.
IN 2021, THE STABILISATION OF MONETARY POLICY HAS CONTINUED TO CONTRIBUTE, ALBEIT LESS SO THAN IN 2020,
TOWARDS IMPROVING INTERBANK AND WHOLESALE FUNDING CONDITIONS
Chart 2.6
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The dots show the daily figure for the €STR-DFR and repo-DFR spreads, respectively (vertical axis), and the excess liquidity (horizontal axis). The 
post-COVID period runs from 26 June to 31 December 2020. The data for 2021 include from 1 January to 22 October 2021.
b The solid line (blue) shows the spread between the Euribor-3M (3-months forward) rate and the OIS curve 3-month forward rate, while the series of 
points shows the projections for this spread over different time horizons.
c The credit risk spread is calculated for unsecured debt bonds issued in euro by Spanish banks (Santander, BBVA and CaixaBank). First, the average interest 
rate on the secondary market for these bonds is obtained and the spread is calculated against the German Bund (risk-free) with the same maturity.
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reflected also in the wholesale funding market, where costs have decreased or held 
steady in 2021 for most debt instruments, particularly in the case of different types 
of senior debt (non-preferred, secured and unsecured).  Also, the cost of issuance is 
less dispersed in these cases, unlike subordinated debt (Tier II) and contingent 
convertible bonds (CoCos), where dispersion has increased due to the divergence 
of costs observed between banks. The dispersion in the cost of CoCo issuance 
indicates that in 2020 this had been limited to larger banks, whereas in 2021, smaller 
banks have also been able to issue CoCos, at a higher cost. In the first ten months 
of 2021, banks have benefitted from these lower funding costs to increase the volume 
of issues of instruments directly associated with regulatory, prudential or resolution 
requirements, in particular, MREL-eligible instruments classified as senior non-
preferred instruments.14 However, this has not occurred in the issuance of secured 
or unsecured senior bonds, whose volume decreased with respect to 2020, largely 
owing to the current context of excess liquidity.
Bank deposits have slowed, but continue to grow at a good pace. Indeed, 
households and companies have moderated the pace of growth of their deposits in 
institutions once uncertainty has been reduced, the profitability of other financial 
assets has increased, there is no longer forced savings and most of the loan 
programme with public guarantees has been deployed. Specifically, the year-on-year 
rate of change of deposits from households and firms until June 2021 stood at close 
to 5% in business in Spain, around 2.5 pp below the rate observed in the same month 
of the previous year. The slowdown is being more intense among firms, which register 
yearly increases of just 2%. Unlike other European countries, the volume of deposits 
remunerated at negative rates is not material and is limited to large firms.
2.1.2 Profitability and solvency
Profitability
The	Spanish	banking	system	earned	consolidated	net	profit	of	€13.8	billion	in	
2021	H1,	up	significantly	on	the	figure	for	the	same	period	of	2020. After the 
losses recognised by the Spanish banking sector in 2020 H1, consolidated net profit 
has improved by €23 billion. This translates into a return on assets (ROA) of 0.71% 
(up 1.2 pp from -0.5% in June 2020) and a return on equity (ROE) of 11.2% (up 18.5 
pp from -7.3% in June 2020).15
Extraordinary	gains	and	losses	(a	net	loss	in	2020	and	a	net	gain	in	2021)	have	
a	significant	impact	on	this	year-on-year	improvement	in	profitability. In 2021 
14  This category also includes CoCos and eligible subordinated debt instruments as Tier II capital.
15	 	In	the	case	of	ROE,	the	year-on-year	difference	also	increased	due	to	the	5%	decline	in	average	equity	between	
June	2020	and	June	2021,	whereas	average	total	assets	held	steadier	during	that	period,	growing	by	1.9%.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 61 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
H1 there was a net gain of more than €2.5 billion, while in 2020 H1 there was a net 
loss of more than €14 billion.16  Excluding these extraordinary items, the sector’s 
ROA would have stood at 0.6%, an increase of 0.3 pp from June 2020 (which would 
have been 0.3%) (see Chart 2.7.1). In June 2021 the geographical distribution of the 
profit of Spanish banks with significant international presence returned to values 
similar to those of June 2019 (see Chart 2.8.1). Behind Spain, Mexico, the United 










appreciation	of	 the	 local	 currencies	against	 the	euro.	The	profit	measured	 in	 euro	diminished	partially	 in	 the	
United	States	and	Turkey	due	to	the	appreciation	of	the	euro	against	their	local	currencies.		
After the losses recognised in June 2020, the Spanish banking sector's profitability recovered in 2021 H1. In addition to the positive impact
of the extraordinary items, lower provisioning also contributed to this improvement. The increase in profitability was widespread among 
banks, resulting in it standing at levels similar to those prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR'S PROFITABILITY IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN JUNE 2021 COMPARED WITH A YEAR
EARLIER. THIS WAS LARGELY BECAUSE OF EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS AND LOWER IMPAIRMENT PROVISIONING
Chart 2.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars denotes a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in consolidated profit in June 
2021 compared with June 2020. The black diamonds denote the ROA excluding extraordinary items. Specifically, in June 2020: adjustments to 
goodwill (-€12.2 billion), the adjustment for deferred tax assets (-€2.5 billion) and the sale of an asset management business (€0.3 billion); and in 
June 2021: an extraordinary net gain as a result of a merger (€2.9 billion) particularly, badwill; the spin-off of an insurance company (€0.9 billion) 
and extraordinary restructuring costs (-€1.2 billion).
b Including, among others, the aforementioned extraordinary items.
c The chart depicts the density function of ROA for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by average total assets. The density function is estimated 
by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, smoothed graphic representation of the 
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In	 2021	H1	 the	 profitability	 of	 our	 European	 peers’	 banking	 systems	 also	
improved, with it close to returning to pre-pandemic levels. Despite other 
European banks also seeing net interest income decrease between June 2020 
and June 2021, the steep decline in impairment provisioning led to improved 
profitability in the sector at European level (see Chart 2.8.2). In recent years, 
Spanish banks’ net interest income and impairment provisioning have been higher 
than those of their European peers. 
Profitability	has	 improved	across	the	board,	and	the	sector’s	pre-pandemic	
profitability	 levels	 have	 been	 resumed.	Compared with the previous year, the 
distribution of ROA in June 2021 has shifted markedly to the right. This reflects the 
widespread improvement in profit in the sector. This upturn was more pronounced 
at a group of banks that fared worse in June 2020. Consequently, the distribution of 
ROA in June 2021 is similar to the pre-pandemic distribution (see Chart 2.7.2). Even 
so, it should be borne in mind that the banking sector’s low profitability, both in 
Spain and in the main European countries, was already one of the sector’s main 
challenges before the pandemic broke.  
The significant decline in cost of risk (provisioning) led to an improvement in the sector’s profitability at European level, despite net interest 
income decreasing for European banks between June 2020 and June 2021. In June 2021 the amount and geographical distribution of the 
profit of banks with significant international activity returned to values similar to those of June 2019.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SPANISH BANKS’ PROFIT IS APPROACHING ITS PRE-CRISIS LEVEL AND
COMPOSITION. MEANWHILE, THE PROFITABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTOR AS A WHOLE HAS IMPROVED,
UNDERPINNED BY THE LOWER COST OF RISK
Chart 2.8
SOURCES: European Banking Authority and Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores.
a Four banks with significant international activity are included in this chart and non-recurring items in the period 2019-2021 are excluded.
b Percentiles calculated based on the aggregate financial ratios published by the EBA for each of the banking systems in the EU; the United Kingdom 
is excluded from the sample of countries in the three years considered. Net interest income is defined as interest income less interest expense 
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Lower impairment provisioning – which, at consolidated level, returned to 
pre-pandemic	 levels	 –	 was	 behind	 the	 improvement	 in	 ordinary	 profit. 
Consolidated provisioning charges for impairment losses on financial assets fell by 
50% to stand at levels similar to pre-pandemic ones (see Chart 2.9.1). Provisioning 
in operations in Spain decreased by almost as much as consolidated provisioning, 
but remained above pre-pandemic levels. The potential materialisation of latent 
risks and their impact on credit quality might require some banks to recognise 
additional provisions over the coming years. This is especially true under the least-
favourable scenario for the effectiveness of the support measures rolled out in 
response to the pandemic (see Chart 2.9.2). The scale of this additional effort is 
markedly uneven across banks.      
Provisioning charges recognised in 2021 H1 are 50% lower than those recognised in 2020 H1 as a result of the improved outlook for the 
potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on credit quality. At consolidated level, this decrease resulted in provisioning returning to 
pre-pandemic levels. Provisioning charges associated with operations in Spain remain above their pre-pandemic levels. The estimated 
additional provisioning needs over the coming years are uneven among banks and  depend, among other factors, on the degree of credit 
impairment of the loan portfolio guaranteed by the ICO.
PROVISIONING CHARGES IN 2021 H1 FELL TO HALF THE AMOUNT RECOGNISED IN THE SAME PERIOD OF 2020. THE DECLINE
WAS LESS STEEP IN OPERATIONS IN SPAIN
Chart 2.9
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Systemic Risk Board.
a The estimated provisioning charges for the period 2021-2023 are obtained from the baseline scenario used in the FLESB stress-testing exercise. 
Banks are grouped into three categories, based on the volume of estimated provisioning charges relative to the 2021 provisioning effort. The bars 
depict the aggregate lending of each category of bank as a percentage of total lending. The first group (no additional provisioning need) comprises 
banks whose 2021 provisioning effort (those provisions recognised for 2021 H1, multiplied by two to extrapolate them for the entire year) is sufficient 
to cover the estimated provisioning requirements for 2021-2023 under the FLESB framework. The second group (average additional provisioning 
needs) is formed by banks whose provisioning effort in 2021 is between 50% and 100% of the provisioning charges estimated for 2021-2023. The 
third group (high additional provisioning needs) consists of banks whose provisioning charges in 2021 are below 50% of the provisioning charges 
estimated for 2021-2023. For the estimated provisioning over the entire 2021-2023 period, two scenarios are considered in relation to the effect of 
the support measures (essentially the ICO guarantee scheme): moderate and average. Under the moderate scenario, the quality of credit guaranteed 
by the ICO is similar to that of the overall business lending portfolio. Meanwhile, under the average scenario credit quality is at a midway point 
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Gross	income	fell	in	2021	H1	compared	with	the	same	period	a	year	earlier,	as	
the	decline	in	net	interest	income	was	not	offset	by	the	improvement	in	net	fee	
and commission income (see Annex 2). Net interest income fell 5.1% year-on-year, 
while net fee and commission income increased 4%. The more than 10% drop in 
gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities also contributed to the decline in 
gross income. The operating expenses of the sector as a whole rose. This led to a 
decline in net operating income and to an increase of almost 3 pp in the cost-to-
income ratio (from 48.8% in June 2020 to 51.7% in June 2021). However, excluding 
the extraordinary costs associated with the merger of two banks during this period 
(see footnote 16), net operating income would have fallen less and the cost-to-
income ratio would have improved slightly. In any event, the efficiency advantage 
over our European peers’ banking systems has been retained (see Chart 2.10.1). 
From a structural standpoint, the number of branches continue to fall across the 
euro area, with the employment level remaining more stable (see Chart 2.10.2).
Solvency
Capital	ratios	improved	slightly	in	2021	H1,	and	significantly	over	the	last	12	
months (see Chart 2.11.1). This was due both to the increase in capital levels (the 
ratios’ numerators) and to the decline in risk-weighted assets (RWAs) (the ratios’ 
Broadly speaking, the cost-to-income ratio of our peers’ banking systems has improved after the downturn recorded in 2020 H1 due to the 
period’s atypical effects. The cost-to-income ratio of Spanish institutions in 2021 is still affected by extraordinary negative factors. From a 
structural standpoint, the number of branches continues to decrease throughout the euro area, while the adjustment to employment has 
stalled.
SPANISH BANKS MAINTAIN THE COST-TO-INCOME RATIO ADVANTAGE OVER THEIR EUROPEAN PEERS
Chart 2.10
SOURCES: European Central Bank and European Banking Authority.
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denominator). Two distinct stages can be identified. The improvement in the common 
equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio was more pronounced between June 2020 and December 
2020, when it rose by 69 bp. This was the result of growth of 3.6% in CET1 and the 
1.8% decline in RWAs. The measures implemented by the authorities to mitigate the 
impact of the pandemic largely explain these developments.18 The increase in the CET1 
ratio moderated between December 2020 and June 2021 (amounting to 14 bp) due to 
lower growth in CET1 in that period (0.4%) and a smaller decline in RWAs (0.7%). A 
similar pattern is observed for the Tier 1 and total capital ratios (see Chart 2.11.1).19
The	 increase	over	 the	 last	12	months	 in	 the	Spanish	banking	sector’s	CET1	
ratio	was	in	 line	with	that	of	the	main	European	countries. The CET1 ratio of 
Spanish banks continued to trail that of the main European countries and remained 
around 2.7 pp off the European average (see Chart 2.11). This difference vis-à-vis the 
European average existed prior to the COVID-19 crisis and owes partly to structural 
factors such as the greater use of the standardised approach by Spanish banks. 




growth	of	capital	 ratios.	 In	 fully	 loaded	terms,	the	CET1	ratio	grew	most	 (27	bp	 in	2021	H1)	 from	12.77%	in	
December	2020	to	13.04%	in	June	2021.
The CET1 ratio increased by 83 bp between June 2020 and June 2021 to stand at 13.4%, as a result both of the increase in capital and the 
decrease in RWAs. Most of this increase (69 bp) arose in 2020 H2 and was largely due to the measures adopted by the authorities to mitigate 
the effects of the health crisis. The CET1 ratio of Spanish deposit institutions remains the lowest of the main European countries, while 
year-on-year growth in the ratio was in line with the growth recorded by our peers.
THE AGGREGATE CAPITAL RATIOS OF THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR INCREASED SLIGHTLY IN 2021 H1
Chart 2.11
SOURCES: European Banking Authority and Banco de España.
a Data for Spain are in red.
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Indeed, if solvency is measured in terms of the leverage ratio, Spain’s significant 
institutions (5.7%) are in line with the European average.
CET1 increased across the board, whereas the change in RWAs was more 
uneven (see Chart 2.12.1). Indeed, most banks recorded a rise in RWAs. However, 
the total amount of RWAs in the system fell due to the notable decline at some of the 
bigger banks20 and, in particular, to the divestment in the United States by one of the 
banks with the largest international presence. Overall, the CET1 ratio has improved, 
which is reflected by the shift of its distribution to the right (see Chart 2.12.2).
2.1.3  Forward-looking assessment of the Spanish banking system’s resilience





Most banks increased their volume of CET1 between June 2020 and June 2021. Despite the overall decrease in RWAs in the Spanish 
banking sector, most banks increased their RWAs over the last year, with a small but significant number of banks reducing them. The shift 
towards more positive values in the distribution of the CET1 ratio was above all recorded between June 2020 and December 2020.
CET1 INCREASED ACROSS THE BOARD, WHILE THE DECLINE IN RWAs MOSTLY AFFECTED SOME SIGNIFICANT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Chart 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red dots represent banks directly supervised by the SSM. The dots above the bisector depict increases (decreases) in the volume of CET1 
over the last year that are higher (lower) than the increase (decrease) in the volume of RWAs. Consequently, they refer to increases in the CET1 
ratio between June 2020 and June 2021. The opposite applies for the dots beneath the bisector.
b The chart depicts the CET1 ratio density function for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the amount of RWAs. The density function is estimated 
using a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, smoothed graphic representation of the function. The 
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The FLESB framework enables analysis of different macro-financial scenarios using 
a set of models and hypotheses developed in-house (“top-down” approach), 
underpinned by the granular information available through regulatory and supervisory 
reporting. As with last year’s exercise, this year’s also included the effect of the 
economic policy measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, taking into account 
the roll-out of the ICO guarantees since the cut-off date for the previous exercise.21 
Other developments include the consideration of the possible latent credit risk due 
to the combination in 2020 of a severe economic shock and important mitigating 
measures, in addition to the more granular modelling of credit risk in lending to 
business. The methodological fundamentals and main characteristics of this exercise 
are summarised below. 
The	macroeconomic	scenarios	used	match	those	designed	for	the	2021	stress	
test	coordinated	at	European	level	by	the	EBA.22 The baseline scenario covers 
the most likely economic developments over the exercise’s horizon (2021-2023) and 
is used to assess the banking system’s solvency under normal conditions. The 
adverse scenario includes the materialisation of the main risks facing the European 
economy identified by the ESRB. These are related to the uncertainty over the course 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and lower confidence, which would trigger a protracted 
contraction in economic activity and low and even negative interest rates for longer. 
For	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 (see	 Table	 2.1),	 the	 baseline	 scenario	 reflects	 a	
recovery,	 resulting	 in	 cumulative	 real	 GDP	 growth	 over	 the	 three	 years	 of	
13.2%.	 The	 adverse	 scenario	 envisages	 a	 cumulative	 contraction	 of	 3.2%. 
Noteworthy among the other macroeconomic variables is the severity of developments 
in the unemployment rate (21.2% on average over the three years) and house prices 
(a cumulative decline of 17.0%) under the adverse scenario. Interest rates do not 
show signs of being significantly stressed, since the scenarios include the 
expectations that the monetary policy stance will remain expansionary. The paths of 
the macroeconomic variables for the other countries also match those included in 
the EBA 2021 exercise (see Chart 2.13). The baseline scenario reflects a widespread 
recovery, whereas the adverse scenario envisages a persistent contraction in activity, 
both in advanced and in emerging market economies. The FLESB also includes 
other variables of interest that do not feature in the EBA’s scenarios, such as credit 
developments in Spain and in the geographical areas where Spanish banks have a 
significant presence. These are projected using the Banco de España’s in-house 
models in a manner consistent with the other variables in each scenario.
21	 	The	first	scheme	(for	guarantees	totalling	€100	billion)	was	approved	in	March	2020	(Royal	Decree-Law	8/2020).	
It	was	then	increased	in	July	(Royal	Decree-Law	25/2020)	by	a	further	€40	billion.	
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The	portfolios	of	business	loans	are	broken	down	by	sector	of	activity	and	firm	
size	 to	 obtain	 a	 more	 granular	 estimate	 of	 the	 credit	 risk	 parameters. 
Specifically, the sectoral breakdown of those credit portfolios has been enhanced to 
a level similar to two-digit Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities 
(CNAE by its Spanish initials) codes. In addition to the macroeconomic variables of 
the scenarios, this more granular treatment factors in paths for real gross value 
added for each sector and firms’ various financial ratios, which are consistent with 
the scenarios in the projection horizon.23
The	exercise	also	envisages	the	possible	future	deterioration	in	credit	quality,	
which	did	not	materialise	in	2020	because	of	the	positive	effect	of	the	economic	
policy	measures	 implemented	 in	response	to	 the	COVID-19. These measures 
have largely mitigated the economic effects of the pandemic. Yet they have also put 
off some of the financial consequences of the crisis until the future, when households 
and firms will have to repay debts incurred in 2020 to meet liquidity needs stemming 
from the crisis. 
To	facilitate	their	interpretation,	the	results	are	presented	in	three	groups	of	
banks,	as	the	business	models	and	sources	of	risk	vary	across	the	different	
groups. The first group comprises Spanish banks directly supervised by the SSM 
with the most significant international presence.24 The second group consists of the 
other banks under the direct supervision of the SSM. Lastly, the third group includes 






MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR SPAIN IN THE STRESS TEST
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smaller banks with no significant international presence which are under the direct 
supervision of the Banco de España. In all cases, the impacts in terms of the fully 
loaded CET1 ratio are shown.
Results of the stress tests
For	the	group	of	banks	with	greater	 international	activity	supervised	by	the	
SSM	an	 increase	of	1	pp	and	a	decrease	of	2.2	pp	 in	 their	CET1	ratio	were	
projected	under	the	baseline	and	adverse	scenarios,	respectively	 (see Chart 
2.14). This group’s starting CET1 ratio was 11.8 pp, lower than that of the other two 
groups of banks. Under the baseline scenario, available provisions to cover 
impairment losses in Spain (2% of RWAs) and the capacity to generate new capital 
(4.2% of RWAs) offset the volume of impairment losses in operations in Spain and 
sovereign exposure valuation adjustments (overall, 3.7% of RWAs). As a result of the 
global recovery forecast over the period 2021-2023, operations outside Spain help 
increase net profit under the baseline scenario. Conversely, the other impacts make 
a negative contribution (1.6% of RWAs) to solvency, due to the net effect of other 
gains and losses, the effect of taxes and profit distributions. The final result is a 
CET1 ratio of 12.8 pp in 2023. Under the adverse scenario, the continued contraction 
in activity results in a significantly lower generation of capital (1% of RWAs). This is 
largely because of the greater impairment losses in operations outside Spain and, in 
The scenarios for the other geographical areas where Spanish banks have significant activity are also consistent with those used in the EBA 
stress-testing exercise conducted at European level. The baseline scenario assumes a widespread recovery, whereas the adverse scenario 
envisages the materialisation of risks to financial stability related to the uncertainty surrounding the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and a 
drop in confidence causing a prolongation of the downturn.
IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS WHERE SPANISH BANKS HAVE SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE, THE BASELINE SCENARIO
ENVISAGES A WIDESPREAD RECOVERY, WHEREAS THE ADVERSE SCENARIO REFLECTS A PROLONGATION OF THE
CONTRACTION TRIGGERED BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Chart 2.13
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the same vein, impairment losses in Spain totalling 5.7% of RWAs. Under the adverse 
scenario, the CET1 ratio stands at 9.6% at the end of the projection horizon.
For	 the	 other	 banks	 supervised	 by	 the	 SSM,	 an	 increase	 of	 1.3	 pp	 and	 a	
decrease	of	 3.3	pp	 in	 the	CET1	 ratio	 are	estimated	under	 the	baseline	and	
adverse	scenarios,	respectively (see Chart 2.15). This group’s CET1 ratio at the 
start of the exercise (13.9%) was better than that of banks with significant international 
activity. Under the baseline scenario, impairment losses in Spain (9.3% of RWAs) are 
significantly higher than in the case of banks with significant international activity 
because of the lesser geographical distribution of their risks. Provisions (4.7%) and 
the generation of net operating income (5.8%) more than suffice to absorb the 
impairment losses, thereby raising the CET1 ratio to 15.2%. Under the adverse 
scenario, generation of capital falls vis-à-vis the baseline scenario (4.2% of RWAs) 
and impairment losses increase (15.4% of RWAs). This results in solvency being 
undermined, despite the positive contribution (3.2%) of the other impacts, associated 
with the lower lending projected under this scenario.  Capital consumption under the 
adverse scenario is higher than for the other groups of banks, resulting in a CET1 
ratio of 10.6% in 2023. 
Banks with significant international exposure remain notably resilient, despite the relatively high volume of impairment losses in operations in 
Spain under both scenarios. Under the baseline scenario the use of provisions and the generation of capital offset the impairment losses, 
while under the adverse scenario the additional impairment and lower capital-generation capacity lead to a decrease in the 2023 CET1 ratio 
compared with the starting ratio. However, it remains above the minimum requirement.
THE BANKS WITH THE LARGEST INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE REMAIN FIRMLY RESILIENT, EVEN TO THE CONTINUED 
GLOBAL DOWNTURN ENVISAGED UNDER THE ADVERSE SCENARIO
Chart 2.14
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) bars indicate a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in the CET1 ratio at the end of the projection 
horizon (2023) compared with the start of the exercise (2020).
b Generation of loss-absorbing capital in the case of banks with significant international activity includes the net operating income for Spain and net 
profit in operations abroad.
c Impairment losses on loans and foreclosed assets in operations in Spain and the impact on capital of a potential deterioration of sovereign 
exposures at consolidated level.
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The	CET1	ratio	of	the	institutions	supervised	directly	by	the	Banco	de	España	
improves	under	both	the	baseline	and	adverse	scenarios,	rising	2.6	pp	and	1.3	
pp,	respectively	 (see Chart 2.16), with	the	latter	result	 largely	stemming	from	
the	institutions’	deleveraging.	This third group of institutions has a higher starting 
CET1 ratio (18.8 pp) than the other groups and a simpler and more conservative 
business model in terms of products (a higher relative share of mortgage loans and 
government debt holdings). They also operate in a reduced geographical area. Under 
the baseline scenario, existing provisions (4.8% of RWAs) and capital generated 
(4.4% of RWAs) more than offset the impairment losses (6.8% of RWAs). This gives 
rise to an end-exercise aggregate CET1 ratio of 21.4%. Under the adverse scenario, 
the generation of new loss-absorbing capital declines (3.4% of RWAs) and impairment 
losses increase (10.5% of RWAs). However, this set of institutions ends the exercise 
with higher solvency on account of other effects (3.2% of RWAs). Under the adverse 
scenario, the CET1 ratio improvement is primarily linked to the institutions’ 
deleveraging, given that credit – which accounts for a large share of these 
institutions’ exposures – shrinks. Thus, under the adverse scenario the CET1 ratio 
stands at 20.1% in 2023, the highest value of the three groups. 
The other SSM banks record a relatively high volume of impairment losses relative to their loss-absorbing capital in the business in Spain 
under both scenarios. Under the adverse scenario, the use of provisions and generation of net operating income are insufficient to offset the 
losses. However, the end-exercise solvency position is notable, owing to a higher starting CET1 ratio and a degree of deleveraging, captured 
in the RWA reduction included in other impacts.
OTHER SSM BANKS WOULD RECORD RELATIVELY LARGE IMPAIRMENTS RELATIVE TO THEIR LOSS-ABSORBING CAPITAL.
NONETHELESS, THE ENDING CET1 RATIO IS SOUND, PARTLY OWING TO THE FAVOURABLE STARTING POSITION AND RWA
REDUCTION
Chart 2.15
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the columns indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in the CET1 ratio at the end 
of the projection exercise (2023) vis-à-vis the start of the exercise (2020).
b The generation of loss-absorbing capital for other SSM banks mainly includes net operating income in Spain, with a very small contribution from net 
profit from foreign operations.
c Impairment losses on loans and foreclosed assets in business in Spain, and the impact on capital of the potential impairment on sovereign 
exposures at consolidated level.
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These	 results	 reflect	 Spanish	 deposit	 institutions’	 considerable	 aggregate	
resilience against a persistent downturn, although there is some cross-institution 
heterogeneity. All three sets of institutions end the exercise with CET1 ratios above 9% 
under both the baseline and adverse scenarios. However, not all institutions end the 
exercise in the same situation and heterogeneous behaviour in terms of capital charges 
is observed under the adverse scenario. In any case, the distribution of the CET1 ratio 
across banks under the adverse scenario does not suggest the need for extensive 
additional supervisory intervention, in line with the results of other stress tests at European 
level, such as the EBA exercise discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the results are subject 
to the marked uncertainties facing the banking sector. Caveats specific to the current 
environment should also be highlighted. For instance, the possibility of more adverse 
adjustments in financing conditions than envisaged under the scenarios, were the 
growing risk of financial market correction to intensify and materialise. 
Spanish	institutions	also	had	a	robust	liquidity	position	at	end-2020,	supported	
by	 the	ECB’s	monetary	 policy	 stance. As in previous years, a stress test was 
conducted on the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), with Spanish institutions maintaining 
appropriate liquidity levels comparable to previous tests.
The CET1 ratio of the institutions supervised directly by the Banco de España improves under both the baseline and adverse scenarios, 
despite also deteriorating significantly. As well as starting out with a substantially higher CET1 ratio, the impairment losses are offset by the 
effect of provisions, capital generation and the RWA reduction.
INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISED DIRECTLY BY THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA, WHICH START WITH A HIGH CAPITAL LEVEL AND
EXPOSURE TO LOWER-RISK ASSETS, EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT. HOWEVER, THIS IS OFFSET BY
PROVISIONS, CAPITAL GENERATION AND DELEVERAGING UNDER BOTH SCENARIOS
Chart 2.16
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the columns indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in the CET1 ratio at the end 
of the projection exercise (2023) vis-à-vis the start of the exercise (2020).
b The generation of loss-absorbing capital is determined by net operating income in Spain.
c Impairment losses on loans and foreclosed assets in business in Spain, and the impact on capital of the potential impairment on sovereign 
exposures at consolidated level.
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Granular assessment of the effect of State guarantees and firms’ PDs 
The	exercise	factors	in	the	mitigating	effect	on	Spanish	institutions’	solvency	
had	by	the	public	guarantee	scheme	for	business	 lending. Since the scale of 
this effect remains uncertain, an impact range has been estimated taking into 
account various assumptions regarding the probability of default of the guaranteed 
loans (see Chart 2.17.1). The bottom end of the range assumes that the expected loss 
is equal to the average for the corporate credit portfolio; the top end assumes that 
the guaranteed loans are concentrated among higher-risk debtors. The previous 
section’s findings are based on the impact of the ICO guarantees standing at the 
midpoint of this range. It should be borne in mind that the more impairment losses 
the programme is able to absorb, the greater its budgetary cost. 
The	mitigating	 effects	 of	 the	State	 guarantee	 scheme	 for	 business	 lending	
include	reducing	the	loss	given	default,	but	also	lowering	the	risk	weights	of	
State guarantees for corporate credit have a positive impact on the CET1 ratio under both scenarios, particularly the adverse scenario. The 
more granular treatment of corporate credit portfolios means risk is captured based on sensitivity to the economic cycle and specific potential 
shocks that may affect each sector and firm size.
ICO GUARANTEES LIMIT THE IMPACT ON CAPITAL OF LOAN LOSSES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE UNDER THE ADVERSE
SCENARIO, WHICH PRESENTS AN UNEVEN CREDIT QUALITY IMPAIRMENT RELATIVE TO THE BASELINE SCENARIO ACROSS 
FIRMS OF DIFFERENT SIZE AND SECTOR
Chart 2.17
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The effect of the guarantee facility under an intermediate assumption, together with the restrictions on profit distribution and the impact of TLTROs, 
are incorporated into the main analysis, the results of which are set out in Charts 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16.
b Shown is the range of the measure's impact on the expected loss of the corporates portfolio (left panel) and on the CET1 ratio (right panel), 
depending on the assumptions regarding the credit quality of loans extended to firms and sole proprietors in Spain under the ICO guarantee facility. 
The minimum effect assumes that the expected loss is equal to the average of the corporate lending portfolio, while the maximum effect assumes 
that NPL inflows are primarily concentrated among guaranteed loans. The black line denotes the midrange effect.
c Probability of default (PD) is defined as the probability of transitioning from performing status to non-performing status in a 12-month period. This 
probability is estimated using a model that links observed PD to the firms’ macroeconomic variables and financial ratios. The chart shows the 
density function of the difference (in pp) between the PD estimated for each sector under the adverse scenario vis-à-vis the baseline scenario. This 
is estimated for each bank, but the weighted average for each sector is shown. The weighting is based on number of holders. The density function 
is approximated by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, smoothed graphic 
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the loans. The risk weight of the guaranteed portion of the loans granted under 
the scheme are lowered to the 0% risk weight assigned to sovereign exposures. 
In the event of default, the loss is assumed proportionally by the State. Thus, 
under the baseline scenario the assumptions regarding the guaranteed loans’ 
credit quality would result in the guarantees absorbing between 11.5% and 69.5% 
of the expected loss (midpoint of 40.5%), while under the adverse scenario the 
range is from 15.4% to 78.5% (midpoint of 47%).25 The impact on the CET1 ratio 
at the midpoint would be 0.6 pp and 1.7 pp under the baseline and adverse 
scenario, respectively.
The	 firms’	 characteristics	 (size,	 sector,	 etc.)	 have	 a	 bearing	 on	 the	 PDs	
projected	 for	 the	 loans. Hence, under the adverse scenario the increase in PD 
relative to the baseline scenario is larger for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(see Chart 2.17.2). Likewise, much cross-sector heterogeneity is observed in the 
difference between PDs under the baseline and adverse scenarios. 
Results of the EU-wide stress test published by the European Banking Authority
The	results	obtained	by	the	EBA	for	50	banks	in	the	European	Union	and	the	
European Economic Area show a CET1 capital ratio increase under the 
baseline	scenario	and	a	significant	contraction	under	the	adverse	scenario.	
Under the baseline scenario, this ratio would rise from 15% (fully loaded at end-
2020) to 15.8% in 2023 (see Chart 2.18.1). The Spanish institutions participating in 
the exercise26 would, under this scenario, record a far sharper ratio increase (2.2 pp), 
rising from 11.9% (fully loaded in December 2020) to 14.1% at the end of the projection 
horizon. Under the adverse scenario the participating institutions would, overall, see 
their CET1 capital ratio fall by 4.9 pp, placing it at 10.2% of RWAs at the end of the 
exercise. The reduction is smaller for Spanish banks (of 2.9 pp to 9%). Thus, Spanish 
banks show greater resilience to the adverse scenario and greater capacity to 
generate capital under the baseline scenario than their European peers, despite 
starting out with a lower capital ratio. This was also true in the 2018 EU-wide stress 
tests coordinated by the EBA.
Spanish	 banks	 face	 one	 of	 the	 smallest	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 capital	 ratios	
under the adverse scenario. A country-level analysis of the results (see Chart 
2.18.2) places Spanish banks (together with those of Poland and Norway) among 
those that experience a smaller capital ratio impact. At the other end of the scale are 
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Danish and Irish banks, whose CET1 capital ratios end the exercise down by more 
than 6 pp.
The	differences	–	in	terms	of	methodology,	scope	and	risks	analysed	–	between	
the EBA exercise and the FLESB lie behind certain disparities in the results 
obtained	 for	Spanish	banks.	The most significant differences between the two 
exercises are associated with the fact that the EBA methodology assumes a static 
balance sheet in all years. By contrast, the FLESB adapts to the macroeconomic 
developments implicit in the scenarios. Similarly, the EBA-coordinated exercises 
consider the impact of the scenarios on market and operational risk, aspects that fall 
partially outside the scope of the FLESB. The EBA exercise likewise considers a 
small sample of all Spanish deposit institutions, compared with the broader coverage 
provided by the FLESB. In any event, both exercises evidence the Spanish banking 
sector’s aggregate resilience to an adverse economic environment.
2.1.4 Deposit institutions’ operational risks
Spanish	banks’	operational	risk	losses	have	been	in	decline	since	2015,	with	a	
simultaneous	 increase	 in	 perceived	 cyber	 risks. Despite the reduction in 
operational risk losses (see Chart 2.19.1), the number of external fraud events has 
increased, with the vast majority being cyber incidents. It comes as no surprise, 
then, that concern surrounding cybersecurity has intensified over the last decade (see 
The results obtained show that the participating institutions would, overall, see their CET1 capital ratio increase slightly under the baseline 
scenario and decline by nearly 5 pp under the adverse scenario. The solvency of Spanish banks would change more favourably than the 
average for participating institutions in both exercises.
EUROPEAN BANKS SHOW STRONG RESILIENCE UNDER THE ADVERSE SCENARIO OF THE EBA STRESS TEST, 
WITH BETTER-THAN-AVERAGE RESILIENCE FOR SPANISH BANKS
Chart 2.18

















Participating banks overall Spanish banks
CET1 FL 2020 CET1 FL 2023 BASELINE
CET1 FL 2023 ADVERSE
1  INITIAL CET1 FL AND RESULTS OF THE EBA STRESS TEST   










PL NO ES SE HU BE AT FI NL FR DE IT IE DK
EU/EEA AVERAGE
2  ADVERSE SCENARIO RESULT, COMPARISON ACROSS COUNTRIES
CET1 FL ratio reduction at the end of the exercise horizon
pp
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 76 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
Chart 2.19.2). The extraordinary circumstances of 2020 and the necessary commitment 
to remote working created new opportunities for cybercriminals to exploit the growing 
reliance on communication networks. The three main types of cybersecurity incidents 
in 2020 were data kidnapping, data theft and server hacking. The banking sector is 
particularly susceptible to such attacks, as evidenced by it topping the ranking in terms 
of attack numbers for the fifth consecutive year. Guarding against these increasingly 
frequent and costly incidents entails banks implementing safeguards and mitigation 
measures. The immediate monetary costs stemming from cyber risk are highly 
uncertain. However, the total costs would be even greater and material, since the critical 
asset of customer confidence would be compromised.  
2.2 Non-bank financial sector and systemic interconnections
2.2.1  Non-bank financial sector
Specialised lending institutions
The	credit	extended	by	specialised	lending	institutions	(SLIs)	stabilised	in	the	
last 12 months, while NPLs declined and income statements recovered. In 
Operational risk losses have declined significantly since 2015, although the number of external fraud events has increased. Concern over the 
possible future impact of cyber risks is on a rising trajectory, as revealed by Google searches, although the scant data hinders any systematic 
measurement of their impact and cost.
OPERATIONAL RISK LOSSES HAVE DECLINED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT THERE IS GROWING CONCERN OVER THE FUTURE
COSTS OF CYBER RISKS
Chart 2.19
SOURCES: Google Trends and Banco de España.
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June 2021 the credit extended by SLIs to the resident private sector grew by 0.2% 
year-on-year, improving markedly on previous quarters. The consumer credit 
portfolio (a segment in which SLIs specialise) grew by 5.4% year-on-year, drawing 
close to pre-pandemic levels. NPLs declined sharply in the last 12 months (-13.1%), 
although much of that fall owed to the write-off of NPLs at a single institution. Thus, 
the NPL ratio in June 2021 stood at 6.5%, down 1 pp on the same month a year 
earlier. As with banks, the moderation of loan loss provisions has led to growth in 
profit after tax, in this case by 11.8%, increasing the ROA by 30 bp over the last 12 
months to 1.8% in June 2021. 
Insurance companies
In	 the	 insurance	 sector,	 profitability	 and	 solvency	 indicators	 were	 largely	
unchanged	in	2021	H1,	while	the	companies’	premiums	and	total	assets	both	
grew.27 Specifically, the volume of premiums increased by 5.5% as compared with 
the same period a year earlier, with stronger growth in life premiums (9.3%) than 
non-life premiums (3.4%). The overall saving managed by insurance companies 
increased by 3.2% as compared with the same period a year earlier.  
Investment funds
Investment	funds	domiciled	in	the	euro	area	recorded	net	capital	inflows	in	
2021	 H1.	 Inflows have steadily recovered since end-2020, coinciding with an 
improvement in economic expectations (see Chart 2.20.1), and rising returns in 
some segments, following the sharp outflows during the initial weeks of the 
pandemic in certain segments of the industry. This recovery has been intense, 
comfortably offsetting the outflows that took place at the onset of the crisis, with 
the exception of funds domiciled in Italy. Developments in capital flows differ 
across the various vehicles, with equity funds recording the strongest flows. 
Inflows have been more moderate for mixed funds, which invest in both fixed 
income and equity, and above all in bond and money market funds, with some 
jurisdictions even registering net capital outflows.
Spanish	investment	funds	tend	to	have	a	fixed-income	portfolio	with	shorter	
maturities	and	larger	liquidity	holdings	than	average	for	euro	area	funds. For 
the latter, the average maturity of fixed-income portfolios is around ten years, while 
that for funds domiciled in Spain is considerably shorter (around four and a half 
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years). The value of the exposures is therefore less sensitive to changes in interest 
rates (see Chart 2.20.2). Regarding these vehicles’ holdings of liquid assets 
(approximated through deposit and cash holdings as a percentage of the total), the 
values for funds domiciled in Spain (10.6%) are five times higher than for the euro 
area overall, although such holdings have declined slightly in the last two years for 
Spanish funds. Both the maturity and liquid asset holdings of Spanish funds appear 
to denote a liquidity risk profile below the average for euro area funds. However, this 
higher liquidity may come at the cost of lower profitability relative to funds in the euro 
area overall. Lastly, it should be noted that the Spanish financial system could be 
exposed to risks through funds not domiciled in Spain operating in global financial 
markets with significant cross-jurisdiction interconnections.
Pension funds
There has been a broad-based decline in net contributions to pension funds in the 
year to date, while their returns and total assets have risen. Despite the drop in net 
contributions, in June 2021 pension plan assets had increased by 10.9% as 
In recent months, net capital inflows into euro area investment funds have increased, essentially due to higher flows for equity funds. In the last 
year and half, the average maturity of these vehicles’ fixed-income portfolios has increased moderately, meaning the value of the funds’ exposures 
could be more sensitive to changes in interest rates. Holdings of highly liquid assets have declined slightly in the funds domiciled in Spain.
EURO AREA INVESTMENT FUND CAPITAL INFLOWS PERSISTED IN H1, WITH THE MATURITY OF THEIR FIXED-INCOME 
PORTFOLIOS RISING SLIGHTLY SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS
Chart 2.20
SOURCES: Refinitiv, Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector, ECB and Banco de España.
a Cumulative change in investment fund net capital inflows and outflows, as a percentage of the total net assets of the funds of each country on 
15 January 2020, drawing on a representative sample of funds domiciled in euro area countries. The data for days with atypical flow values are 
omitted. Data up to early-October  2021.
b Average maturity refers to the weighted average remaining maturity (in years) of long position bonds in investment fund portfolios (the weightings 
are the volume of holdings). The degree of liquidity of the holdings is measured as the ratio of deposits and cash held by the investment funds to 
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compared with the same month a year earlier, with H1 also showing growth (4.7% 
since December 2020). This increase reflects pension funds’ high annual average 
returns, which have climbed by 12.78 pp since June 2020 to stand at 11% in June 
2021. For their part, long-term returns (25 years) have held at around 3.4% in the last 
12 months.
2.2.2 Systemic interconnections 
The	 analysis	 of	 interconnections	 between	 different	 economic	 agents	 and	
markets	 helps	 identify	 potentially	 systemic	 vulnerabilities	 resulting	 from	
linkage	within	the	financial	sector	itself	or	with	the	non-financial	sector. This 
section analyses the banking sector’s direct exposure to other economic sectors 
and the indirect interconnections within the Spanish financial system through 
common holdings. 
The	 Spanish	 banking	 system’s	 total	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 vis-à-vis	 other	
resident	 and	 non-resident	 sectors	 increased	 slightly	 during	 the	 first	 few	
months	of	the	health	crisis.	In	the	case	of	assets,	this	was	followed	by	slight	
moderation over the subsequent quarters. The value of the banking sector’s 
assets vis-à-vis other sectors has held close to 190% of GDP since end-2019, with 
a temporary upturn around mid-2020 (see Chart 2.21.1). For the banking sector’s 
liabilities, which stand close to 180% of GDP, the increase recorded in mid-2020 
appears not to have reversed (see Chart 2.21.2). The distribution of the assets reveals 
relatively uniform exposure to households and NFCs and smaller exposure to general 
government. Box 2.3 analyses these exposures to the public sector in greater depth; 
whose contribution to the risks of the banking sector during the COVID-19 crisis is 
very different to that during the global financial crisis. However, on the liability side 
exposures to households (essentially deposits) predominate. It should also be noted 
that the banking sector’s assets vis-à-vis investment funds, insurance companies 
and pension funds are far lower (less than 1% of GDP) than those held with non-
financial sectors and other financial sectors (19% of GDP).28 The liabilities held by 
banks vis-à-vis insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds stand 
close to 2%, 4% and 1% of GDP, respectively, throughout the period. International 
exposures are significant, with similar shares for assets (51% of GDP) and liabilities 
(48% of GDP).
Banks’	 indirect	 interconnectedness	 with	 other	 resident	 financial	 sectors,	
measured	via	common	securities	holdings,	is	largely	unchanged	relative	to	the	
pre-pandemic	 situation,	 while	 that	 of	 other	 financial	 sectors	 has	 declined	
28	 	Other	 financial	 sectors	 include	 specialised	 lending	 institutions	 and	 financial	monetary	 institutions	 other	 than	
insurance	 companies,	 investment	 funds	 and	 pension	 funds	 (such	 as:	 financial	 auxiliaries,	 captive	 financial	
institutions	and	money	lenders	and	other	financial	intermediaries).	
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somewhat.29,30 The interconnections between the banking sector and other 
financial sectors were highly stable between December 2019 and June 2021, 
except for a slight decline in interconnectedness with investment funds (see Chart 
2.22). However, there has been a more evident reduction in interconnectedness 
between investment and pension funds and other financial sectors. This reduction 
comes alongside a compositional change, with increased interconnectedness 
through high credit quality assets (AAA to AA-) and unrated assets, and reduced 
interconnectedness through exposures of intermediate credit quality (A+ to A-). 
There has also been a broad-based decline in indirect interconnections between 
29	 	The	common	holdings	refer,	for	instance,	to	the	same	holdings	of	a	bank	and	an	insurance	of	debt	securities	




billion	 for	pension	 funds.	These	amounts	 represent	around	24%	of	 individual	 financial	assets	 for	 the	banking	
sector	 and	 80%	 for	 the	 resident	 non-bank	 financial	 sectors	 considered	 in	 this	 analysis	 (investment	 funds,	
insurance	companies	and	pension	funds).
At June 2021, exposure to the resident non-financial sector predominated on the asset side (123% of GDP), while exposure to resident 
financial institutions was limited to 19% of GDP. On the liability side, the resident non-financial sector accounted for a somewhat lower share 
(116% of GDP), and in addition to liabilities vis-à-vis other financial sectors (17% of GDP, 1 pp higher than pre-crisis) there are relevant 
liabilities vis-à-vis insurance companies and investment and pension funds (combined share of 7% of GDP, 0.2 pp higher than pre-crisis). The 
international exposures are relevant, with similar shares for assets (51% of GDP) and liabilities (48% of GDP).
THE LEVEL AND STRUCTURE OF BANKS' DIRECT INTERCONNECTIONS WITH OTHER SECTORS THROUGH THEIR ASSETS 
AND LIABILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED BY THE CRISIS (a)
Chart 2.21
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Individual data, presented as a percentage of 2019 GDP.
b The “other financial sectors” category includes specialised lending institutions and non-monetary financial institutions other than insurance 
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insurance companies and other financial sectors, albeit far more moderate and 
with smaller compositional changes.  
The common holdings of various financial intermediaries are concentrated in high credit quality bonds. As was the case in previous periods, 
common holdings represent a lower proportion of total assets for banks than for other financial intermediaries.
A SLIGHT DECLINE IS OBSERVED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTORS' COMMON HOLDINGS, ESPECIALLY INVESTMENT 
AND PENSION FUNDS (a)
Chart 2.22
SOURCES: Securities Holding Statistics by Sector and Refinitiv.
a Each column represents one financial sector’s common holdings with another, as a proportion of the former’s total securities portfolio, with the 
different rating segments identified. For each financial sector, the share of common holdings with each of the other three is shown at 2019 Q4 and 
2021 Q2. For example, the first column shows that, at 2019 Q4, the common holdings between banks and investment funds represented 47% of 
the banking sector’s total securities portfolio. Of these, approximately 11% have ratings on the cusp of investment-grade (BBB+ to BBB-). Taken 
into account are the market value of the holdings reported by the institutions (or, if applicable, the fair value) and the long positions in the portfolio 
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